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Recent Cases
INJURED CONSUMER
PREVAILS IN STRICT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ACTION DESPITE
MANUFACTURER'S
PRODUCT WARNING
The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held
that the manufacturer of a defec-
tive power sweeper was strictly
liable for the consumer's injuries.
In Austin v. Lincoln Equipment
Assoc., Inc., 888 F.2d 934 (1st Cir.
1989), the court found that the
sweeper's operator had established
a prima facie case that the power
sweeper was unreasonably danger-
ous. The court held that the opera-
tor had neither assumed the risk of
using the sweeper nor misused it,
despite his failure to heed the
warning label.
Background
On the date of the accident,
Otis Austin ("Austin") used a pow-
er sweeper manufactured by Gar-
lock Equipment Company ("Gar-
lock") to sweep a flat rooftop in
Providence, Rhode Island. As an
employee for a roofing company,
Austin's job was to sweep gravel
into rows so that other employees
could remove the gravel with hand-
brooms and shovels. After partially
completing the job, Austin stopped
the sweeper approximately two to
five feet from the roof's edge,
despite the warning label on the
sweeper which read, "CAUTION!
DO NOT OPERATE WITHIN
TEN FEET OF EDGE OF
ROOF." When Austin restarted
the machine, it bucked backwards
against him; he fell off the roof and
suffered severe injuries. Austin
sued both Garlock and the seller of
the machine, Lincoln Equipment
Associates, Inc. ("Lincoln"),
claiming that the machine was de-
fective. He claimed that the sweep-
er's brush and wheel clutch failed
to engage properly due to a poorly
designed interlock mechanism.
The U.S. District Court's Decision
At trial before the United
States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Rhode Island, Garlock
moved for a directed verdict; the
motion was denied. At the close of
trial, the court submitted special
interrogatories to the jury. In re-
sponse, the jury found Garlock
strictly liable, but it found Lincoln
not liable. The jury further found
that Austin had not assumed the
risk of injury by operating the
machine within ten feet of the roof
edge. However, the jury found that
Austin was 60% negligent. Taking
Austin's negligence into account,
the jury awarded him $160,000.
Garlock did not object to the ver-
dict before the jury was dismissed.
Nine days after trial, Garlock
moved for a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict on the grounds
that it was not liable as a matter of
law. Garlock alternatively moved
for a new trial on the grounds that
the jury had reached inconsistent
verdicts for Lincoln and Garlock.
The district court denied the mo-
tions. Garlock appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, raising both is-
sues on which the district court had
denied Garlock's motions.
Products Liability in Rhode Island
In 1971, Rhode Island adopt-
ed the theory of strict liability
found in section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts ("Re-
statement"). Section 402A pro-
vides:
One who sells any product in
a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his proper-
ty is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused
... if (a) the seller is engaged
in the business of selling such
a product, and (b) it is expec-
ted to and does reach the user
or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §
402A(l) (1965). This rule of strict
liability applies even if the seller
has exercised all possible care in
preparing and selling the product.
According to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, strict liability at-
taches only if the defect renders the
product unsafe for its intended use
or if the manufacturer fails to warn
of any dangers posed by the prod-
uct that are reasonably foreseeable
at the time of marketing.
"Consumer Expectation
Test." In strict products liability
cases, the injured party must prove
that the product is defective and
that the defect causd his injury.
Rhode Island courts employ a
"consumer expectation test" to de-
termine whether a product is de-
fective under the strict liability
definition. This standard protects
consumers who may be unaware of
the dangers posed by using a prod-
uct as it was intended to be used.
Under this standard, a defect ren-
ders a product "unreasonably dan-
gerous" if it creates a strong likeli-
hood that the user will be injured.
A manufacturer's failure to warn
consumers of a foreseeable, unrea-
sonable danger inherent in its
product is grounds for strict prod-
ucts liability. However, in strict
products liability cases, Rhode Is-
land courts determine the manu-
facturer's and the consumer's rela-
tive liability for the consumer's
injuries by considering the parties'
comparative negligence, and allow
a complete defense to the manufac-
tuer if the consumer assumed the
risk of operating the product.
The First Circuit's Opinion
Austin's Prima Facie Case.
The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit initially
assessed whether Austin had estab-
lished a prima facie case by pro-
ducing enough evidence at trial to
support the jury's verdict. The
court found that the evidence was
sufficient to show Garlock's sweep-
er was unreasonably dangerous.
The sweeper's interlock mecha-
nism was meant to ensure that the
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brush and wheel clutches simulta-
neously engaged, preventing any
backward thrust. Austin's expert
witness testified that a poorly de-
signed interlock mechanism
caused the machine's sudden back-
ward motion. The court concluded
that the interlock mechanism
could reasonably be construed as a
defect under the strict liability def-
inition. The court further found
that the machine's bucking motion
could reasonably be construed to
have caused Austin's injury. Thus,
the court found that Austin had
presented to the trial court a prima
facie case sufficient to justify the
jury's verdict.
Assumption of Risk. Garlock
contended that the assumption of
risk defense barred any liability
and, therefore, required a judg-
ment in its favor as a matter of law.
This contention, if accepted,
would relieve Garlock of liability.
To establish an assumption of risk
defense, Garlock had to prove that
Austin was aware of the specific
risk that the machine might knock
him backwards, appreciated the
magnitude of the risk, and volun-
tarily exposed himself to the dan-
ger. The appellate court noted that
Austin was an experienced roofer
who appreciated the inherent dan-
ger of working on rooftops. He
frequently had worked with the
sweeper and knew it exerted "some
backward pressure" each time he
started it. However, Austin testi-
fied that he did not realize the
sweeper could jump back in the
way it had on this occasion, and
that he had neither read the warn-
ing label nor received any instruc-
tions on operating safety. On the
strenghth of Austin's testimony,
the appellate court found that the
trial court properly denied the mo-
tion for directed verdict based on
assumption of risk.
"Carelessness" Not the Same
as "Misuse." Next, Garlock con-
tended that Austin had misused
the machine. A product is not
considered defective if the con-
sumer's misuse caused the injury.
According to Garlock, by using the
sweeper within two to five feet of
the roof s edge, despite the dis-
played warning label proscribing
operating the machine within ten
feet of a roof s edge, Austin had
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misused the product. The appellate
court found that Austin had not
misused the sweeper. Misuse is
using the product for a purpose not
intended or foreseen by the manu-
facturer. The purpose of the sweep-
er was to sweep gravel, the exact
task for which Austin employed it.
The court stated that "careless"
use of a product for its intended
purpose is not the same as misuse.
Garlock also argued that Aus-
tin's use of the sweeper in a man-
ner contrary to the warning was
tantamount to misuse. The court
held that a warning negates strict
liability only if following the warn-
ing would have abated the danger.
In this case, although Austin's use
of the sweeper near the roof s edge
compounded the danger, Garlock
was still strictly liable because the
sweeper was dangerous even if the
warning had been heeded. The
court stated, "[i]f a product is
unsafe regardless of whether the
user has followed the manufactur-
er's warning, the user's careless
failure to do so is simply contribu-
tory negligence." Accordingly, the
appellate court agreed with the
trial court's denial of Garlock's
motion for directed verdict based
on a misuse theory.
Manufacturer Waived Objec-
tion to Inconsistent Verdict. Gar-
lock lastly contended that the jury
verdicts against it, as manufactur-
er, but for Lincoln, as seller, were
inconsistent and required a new
trial. The court agreed that, absent
special circumstances not present
in this case, if the manufacturer of
a product is found strictly liable,
the seller also is liable. The court
declined to consider the issue,
however, because Garlock had not
raised the objection in a timely
fashion. According to the court, a
party waives an inconsistent ver-
dict objection if the objection is
not raised before the jury is dis-
missed. Garlock failed to raise the
objection until nine days after the
trial. Thus, the court considered
the objection waived.
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ADVERTISEMENTS
FALSELY ALLEGING
"PERMANENT HAIR
REMOVAL" VIOLATED
THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACT
In Removatron International
Corporation v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 884 F.2d 1489 (1st Cir.
1989), the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit held
that deceptively advertising a hair
removal machine violated section
5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act ("FTC Act"), 15 U.S.C. §
45. Additionally, the court granted
the government's motion to pro-
hibit continued advertising in or-
der to prevent future economic
harm to potential purchasers of the
machine.
Factual Background
Removatron International
Corporation ("Removatron") and
Frederick E. Goodman marketed a
hair removal machine, or epilator,
which used tweezers combined
with a burst of radio frequency
energy ("RFE") to destroy hair
follicles, thereby removing un-
wanted body hair. The Federal
Communications Commission
("FCC") approved Removatron's
machine to emit RFE at a particu-
lar frequency. Removatron adver-
tised that the machine permanent-
ly removed hair. Removatron's
advertisements asserted that the
epilator was "clinically tested,"
that the machine (rather than its
RFE) was approved by the FCC,
and that the RFE completely de-
stroyed hair follicles by heating the
surrounding tissue.
Removatron advertised its
machine mainly in beauty industry
trade magazines. Salons usually
purchased the machine for
$4,000.00, and charged individual
customers $35.00 per one hour
treatment. Removatron instructed
the purchaser that several treat-
ments were required in order to
obtain permanent hair removal
and that such treatments might not
work for everyone. Machine own-
ers and operators in turn commu-
nicated the same information in
(continued on page 82)
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